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Abstract 
Mortgage down payment requirements are a fundamental component of traditional home 
purchase loans in the United States. Typically, homebuyers are required to put down a certain 
amount of equity at closing to secure a mortgage and purchase a home. The purpose of this paper 
is to better understand how down payment requirements act as a barrier to obtaining a mortgage 
and buying a home for low-to-moderate-income borrowers. The paper will explore policy 
interventions that attempt to address this barrier in low-and-moderate income communities. 
Using a variety of methods including a national survey and local stakeholder interviews, policy 
critiques, and financial analysis, this paper describes the potential impact varying down payment 
assistance program designs may have on both the borrower and the administrating authority. In 
the end, loan guarantees seem to hold the most benefit for the parties involved given the 
assumptions made. They have the potential to stimulate local housing demand, provide skin in 
the game, and incentivize homeownership in marginalized communities. 
  
Filling the Home Purchase Financing Gap || Christopher Allison 4 
Introduction 
Mortgage down payment requirements are a fundamental component of traditional home 
purchase loans in the United States. Typically, homebuyers are required to put down a certain 
amount of equity at closing to secure a mortgage and purchase a home. The purpose of this paper 
is to better understand how down payment requirements act as a barrier to obtaining a mortgage 
and buying a home for low-to-moderate-income (LMI) borrowers. The paper will explore policy 
interventions that attempt to address this barrier in low-and-moderate income communities. The 
issue of down payment requirements is even more salient in our current economic climate given 
the continued foreclosure crisis and lagging economic recovery of the past few years. Many 
stakeholders, including local governments and nonprofit organizations, are seeking solutions that 
can help stabilize neighborhoods and encourage homebuyers to enter the market again. At the 
same time, with home values significantly discounted due to the overall market turmoil, many 
first-time homebuyers are seeing a historic opportunity to buy homes that would otherwise not be 
within reach financially. Obtaining a mortgage has become a large roadblock to purchasing a 
home due to tightened lending requirements. My hope is to ultimately provide useful policy and 
implementation recommendations for local governments and nonprofit organizations operating 
down payment assistance programs. 
 
While LMI homebuyers face many barriers to accessing mortgage lending, this project will 
specifically focus on barriers related to wealth, or the ability to meet the required down payment 
amount determined by the lender. Down payment assistance programs were created to help LMI 
borrowers overcome this barrier by providing a subsidy to bridge the gap in financing between 
the mortgage loan amount and the selling price. There are a patchwork of programs that help 
homebuyers meet down payment and closing cost requirements to purchase a home. These 
programs take many forms and have varying program designs. They often include income limits 
and are focused on first-time homebuyers in order to target underserved populations. Local and 
state governments administer most down payment assistance programs, while some nonprofit 
organizations also offer assistance. Some programs are targeted toward specific neighborhoods 
to encourage investment, while others are citywide and allow participants to benefit regardless of 
where they move within a given jurisdiction.  
 
The first section of this paper will provide an overview of research related to down payment 
requirements and assistance programs. Next I will use survey and interview data to examine the 
role and importance of down payment assistance in LMI communities. After exploring this 
context, I will outline key policy goals and describe several broad program design models that 
have been developed to address down payment barriers. Once these goals and policies have been 
defined, I will share findings from a financial analysis of five specific program design models 
using market data. I will then make policy and implementation recommendations based on the 
results of the findings of this work. 
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Methodology 
In an attempt to explore the complexity of down payment assistance program design, I have used 
several methodological strategies. These strategies include a literature review, results from a 
national survey of housing counselors, and interviews with stakeholders in three housing 
markets. After outlining policy goals and discussing common down payment assistance 
strategies, I have constructed a financial model to evaluate the potential for several program 
designs to address down payment constraints in LMI communities. 
 
The literature review focuses on barriers to homeownership and down payment assistance as a 
solution to those barriers. While there is not a substantial number of works that address these 
particular issues, key publications and findings are highlighted to provide context. These 
publications most often used quantitative strategies to measure the effects of down payment 
requirements and assistance on LMI homebuyers. 
 
Primary qualitative research has been included to shed light on local perspectives about down 
payment requirements and assistance from the field. The research was conducted in conjunction 
with the UNC Center for Community Capital. These strategies involved a national survey of 
housing counselors and in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in three housing markets. 
Those stakeholders included lenders, real estate agents, appraisers, state housing finance 
agencies, housing counselors, and community development organizations. In total over 100 
housing counselors form across the country completed the online survey. In-depth interviews 
were conducted with over 20 stakeholders in local markets. 
 
The next component in this project involved creating broad policy goals based on the literature 
review, primary research, and my own opinions and values related to increasing access to 
sustainable mortgage lending through down payment assistance. These goals were then used to 
evaluate five broad categories of policy interventions attempting to ease the burden of down 
payment requirements for potential homebuyers.  
 
After understanding how the five broad categories meshed with the assigned goals, further in-
depth financial analysis of two intervention categories was conducted, including several 
iterations of publicly supported second mortgages and alterations to private first mortgages. The 
purpose of this analysis was to construct a financial model grounded in local market assumptions 
that would show the relative impacts of varying program designs on the borrower and down 
payment assistance provider. 
 
There are several limitations to the selected methodological approaches. Literature analyzing 
down payment assistance programs was difficult to identify. Down payment assistance programs 
run the gamut and can include federal and state tax credits, second loans, grants, matched-
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savings accounts, and more. The large variance in interventions makes a comprehensive 
literature review the task of a research project unto itself.  
 
The primary research involved also has its limitations given that questions related to down 
payment assistance were only part of a much larger discussion of the tightening of mortgage 
credit and barriers to accessing mortgages in LMI communities. Most respondents highlighted 
credit history, employment, and appraisal issues as the most pressing concerns related to driving 
demand for mortgage credit in LMI communities, although they also cited down payment 
assistance as a key factor. 
 
Finally, the policy and financial analyses also have significant limitations. The level of analysis 
was mostly conducted at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, making it difficult to 
draw conclusions about cities and neighborhoods within those MSA’s. The financial analysis 
also does not take into account place-based versus people-based strategies and their impact on 
the effectiveness of a down payment assistance program in driving community reinvestment. 
Overall, this analysis looks at the potential benefits to the individual borrower as one of the 
primary measures of effectiveness, despite the explicit policy goal of many down payment 
assistance programs of benefiting communities as a whole. These important dynamics should be 
explored through additional research, but are beyond the scope of this research project.  
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Background 
To frame the context of this research project, this section will explore past research on down 
payment requirements and assistance through a brief literature review. Primary research 
conducted with the UNC Center for Community Capital will then be shared to highlight local 
perspectives on down payment issues. 
Literature Review 
Since down payment assistance is a broad concept with many policy manifestations carried out 
by various market stakeholders (sellers, non-profits, government), it has been difficult to identify 
a comprehensive literature on the subject. The majority of research has focused on a wide variety 
of barriers to obtaining a mortgage, while few have singled out down payment requirements and 
assistance specifically. I will present some of the more prevalent studies and their findings while 
also focusing in-depth on a few of the more detailed analyses related to this research project.  
Barriers to Homeownership 
Many authors have looked into barriers LMI borrowers face obtaining a mortgage and 
purchasing a home. Linneman and Wachter (1989) first looked at barriers to homeownership 
from the perspective of wealth (savings for a down payment) and income (to make monthly 
payments). They found that both were important predictors of successful homeownership. Zorn 
(1989) used a combined measure of wealth and income and found similarly that homeownership 
was less likely given financial constraints.  
 
Later Quercia, McCarthy, and Wachter (2003) employed similar techniques and modeled 
hypothetical mortgage products with varying attributes (such as interest rates and debt-to-income 
requirements). These findings indicated that decreases in down payment requirements led to 
increases in predicted homeownership rates. This focus on down payment gives some credence 
to the focus on down payment assistance programs and their significance in aiding LMI 
homeownership. Barkova et al (2003) found that income constraints were less significant of a 
barrier compared to wealth and credit constraints. They also found that wealth constraints had 
become less significant from the late 1980’s to the 1990’s indicating that lenders may have eased 
some of the traditional underwriting requirements previously in place. My assumption is that this 
is no longer the case given the tightening of credit since the economic downturn. 
Down Payment Assistance 
Down payment assistance programs have been examined by a relatively small number of 
researchers. Herbert and Tsen (2007) found that the number of LMI households that own homes 
could be greatly impacted by relatively small investments in down payment assistance. The most 
significant predictor of whether a household owns a home was whether they had even a modest 
savings of under $1,000. Di, Ma, and Murdoch (2009) analyzed a specific down payment 
assistance program in Dallas and found that there were no detrimental spillover effects on 
property values in neighborhoods where the program was used. In fact, if there were relatively 
few households using down payment assistance, there was a positive spillover effect on 
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surrounding communities. This study has implications for whether a down payment assistance 
program targets a specific neighborhood or lets participants move throughout a city. 
Primary Research 
In addition to reviewing existing academic literature related to down payment requirements and 
assistance, this paper also includes references to primary research conducted by the Center for 
Community Capital (CCC) in partnership with Enterprise Community Partners (Enterprise). This 
work included a national survey of housing counseling agencies and field interviews with 
stakeholders in three housing markets: Atlanta, Cleveland, and Phoenix. The purpose of 
including these findings is to provide context for how down payment barriers play out in LMI 
communities and the perceived value of down payment assistance programs from various local 
perspectives. 
Housing Counselor Survey 
CCC and Enterprise conducted a national survey of housing counseling agencies during the 
summer of 2011 to better understand the barriers to mortgage lending for LMI borrowers. The 
survey asked several questions related to down payment requirements and assistance. The survey 
was administered online to three national networks of housing counseling agencies: National 
Council of La Raza, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, and NeighborWorks. The 
survey instrument involved 54 questions that included fill in the blank, multiple choice, and 
open-ended questions, covering the following topics: current trends, credit barriers, lenders and 
financial products, underwriting guidelines, and overall outcomes. We received 141 completed 
surveys, while each question typically received 117 responses. See Appendix I for the list of 
questions asked related to down payment requirements and assistance. 
 
The survey found that down payment issues were less commonly cited as the primary obstacle to 
homebuyers obtaining mortgage credit than credit score or income/employment issues. 1 The 
majority of counselors did indicate that the minimum requirement had increased in their market 
(see Figure 1). Most participants responded that the lowest down payment options available 
today require between 3% and 3.5% down. The clustering of minimum down payments around 
3.5% is an indication of the important role FHA plays in serving borrowers that would not 
otherwise be able to access mortgage credit. 2  
 
Down payment assistance programs play an important role in helping LMI borrower meet down 
payment requirements, which often involve a loan (often forgivable after a certain term) or 
grants. Over half of the respondents listed these programs as a type of loan used in the past year 
at least 20% of the time. However, most respondents (71%) said that lack of down payment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Counselors responded that down payment requirements were at least sometimes a barrier 67% of the time, while 
2 Many housing counselors are also involved in local down payment assistance programs that reduce or eliminate the 
barrier of down payment requirements, as a result housing counselors may be biased toward underestimating the 
degree down payment requirements prevent LMI homebuyers from accessing mortgage credit in general because of 
their access to these other resources.	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assistance was a barrier. There was particular concern about the current availability of down 
payment assistance with 72% predicting that there would be a severe or modest shortfall in down 
payment assistance funds in 2011. 
 
Figure 1. Responses to Questions About Down Payment as a Barrier 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Minimum Down Payment Responses 
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These survey responses indicate that down payment was a significant barrier for LMI borrowers 
from the perspective of housing counselors that serve this population. It also speaks to the 
importance of down payment assistance in addressing this financing gap. Finally, there are 
clearly concerns that down payment assistance funds may see a shortfall in the near future and 
that would be a detriment to the recovery of the communities where housing counselors work. 
 
Field Interviews 
In total, twenty-one interviews were conducted in the three local markers (seven in each market). 
The participants included local mortgage lenders, real estate agents, state Housing Finance 
Agencies (HFAs), community development corporations (CDCs) and nonprofit housing 
counseling agencies, home appraisers, and academics. The interviews were conducted mostly in 
person and lasted approximately an hour each. Participants were asked a series of questions 
about supply and demand for home purchases and mortgage loans, and barriers to mortgage 
access. They were also asked about programs created to increase access and stabilize 
neighborhoods, including down payment assistance programs.  
 
The field interviews provided substantial insight into each housing market including specific 
challenges and opportunities. This section highlights responses from interview participants 
related to down payment assistance programs and their role in driving home mortgage 
originations after the beginning of the foreclosure crisis in 2008.  
 
All of the stakeholders interviewed discussed the critical importance of down payment assistance 
programs in helping to drive demand in the current housing market and in providing access for 
LMI borrowers to homeownership. In many cases, federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP) funds were used for down payment assistance programs in addition to other city, county, 
and state funds and meant that the funds could potentially be layered on top of one another. This 
was particularly the case in Atlanta where multiple participants discussed the ability to layer 
these funds to maximize the client’s down payment at closing. 
 
Stakeholders in Atlanta said that down payment assistance and low prices were the main drivers 
of demand in the first-time homebuyer market. Using a combination of NSP, HOME, tax-
increment financing, and municipal bonds, some of the down payment assistance funds were 
geographically specific to certain communities in Atlanta while others could be used citywide.3 
These programs were generally viewed as easy to access from the perspective of lenders, real 
estate agents, and community organizations. Respondents believed that there had not been a 
shortage of down payment assistance funds in the past several years, so concerns about 
limitations of funding seemed to be nonexistent among the participants. However, many felt that 
the funds were not enough and that they focused on the individual as opposed to the stability of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Down payment assistance offered by the Atlanta Beltline in designated areas are partly funding using tax-
increment financing to incentivize workforce housing. 
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the community. Since some of the down payment assistance programs can be used citywide or 
even in more suburban counties, they do not necessarily promote homeownership in those 
communities disproportionately affected by the foreclosure crisis.  
 
There was some disagreement in Phoenix about the availability of down payment assistance 
programs and the ability of LMI consumers to access them. Many agreed that down payment 
assistance was an important part of driving demand for homeownership among first-time 
homebuyers, but felt that down payment assistance programs were poorly marketed or had 
insufficient funds to be effective. One participant thought that it was important to consider how 
much down payment assistance was offered in order to understand if it is really affecting 
demand. Some programs only offer 5 percent of the sales price for assistance, while the state is 
much more generous and offers up to 22 percent and acts as a more effective financial incentive. 
While others felt it was more important to offer lower down payment assistance amounts in order 
to help a large number of borrowers given the limited resources. Lenders in Phoenix also 
aggressively use down payment assistance to market to LMI borrowers with one lender saying 
that each of their loan officers in this niche have a list of all the down payment assistance 
programs in the state and are trained to help borrowers access them. 
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Policy Goals and Critique 
By reviewing literature and primary research, this paper has shown the significance of down 
payment requirements as a barrier and the importance of down payment assistance programs in 
helping LMI borrowers overcome these obstacles. Down payment assistance is a patchwork of 
programs that assist potential homebuyers with down payment and closing costs. This patchwork 
includes programs that vary dramatically in their design and funding structure. Based on the 
information presented in this paper, I argue that an ideal down payment assistance program 
would stimulate demand for home purchases, require borrowers to provide some “skin in the 
game” to reduce the likelihood of defaults, and incentivize homeownership in communities most 
affected by the foreclosure crisis. In this section, I will outline these policy goals, which I believe 
would provide for an effective down payment assistance strategy.  
 
First, the program would stimulate demand for home purchases in order to increase activity in 
local housing markets and assist in the rebound of the overall U.S. economy. First-time 
homebuyers are an important driver of the market for owner-occupied homes given the state of 
the housing market. Current homeowners are less likely to purchase a new home in the present 
climate because home values have depreciated significantly leaving many existing homeowners 
underwater on their mortgages (meaning they owe more on their mortgage than their house is 
worth). Many of these homeowners are taking the position of waiting out the present dip in 
values by standing on the sidelines and not purchasing a new home. At the same time, 
historically low home values are presenting potential homeowners in LMI communities with a 
unique opportunity to purchase homes that may have not been within reach during the previous 
boom in the housing market. Therefore, it is important for any down payment assistance program 
to incentivize new purchases by expanding the market in the short term to boost sales and 
economic activity nationally. 
 
Second, it is important for down payment assistance programs to require borrowers to provide 
“skin in the game.” Critics have argued that down payment assistance programs played an 
important role in encouraging lenders to make loans to unqualified borrowers. Once the market 
soured and home prices fell, they argue that homeowners with little equity in their homes (from 
putting little to no money down at purchase) were much more likely to walk away from their 
mortgages leading to higher defaults. In order to design a politically feasible program that takes 
into account these criticisms, any policy should require some form of “skin in the game” as a 
way to ensure ample investment on the part of the borrower. Later in this paper, I suggest various 
ways for borrowers to provide “skin in the game.” 
 
Third, policymakers should target down payment assistant resources to communities hit hardest 
by the bursting of the housing bubble. The foreclosure crisis has not played out evenly 
geographically with some communities bearing the brunt of the market turmoil. Areas of high 
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foreclosure rates should be focused on in order to stabilize housing values in those 
neighborhoods. This is also important because homebuyers are often using down payment 
assistance as a tool to escape marginalized areas and establish themselves in more stable 
neighborhoods. Therefore, it makes sense to layer both city-wide and neighborhood specific 
down payment assistance programs in order to allow freedom of choice while incentivizing 
investment in marginalized communities. 
Policy Critique 
The policy goals outlined in the previous sections provide a framework to evaluate five broad 
down payment assistance designs. These designs include matched savings programs, home 
purchase tax credits, seller-funded assistance programs, forgivable loan products, and loan 
guarantees. I will describe each of these types of assistance while also analyzing how each fits 
into the policy goals outlined above.  
Matched-Savings Accounts 
Matched-savings accounts are often used as an asset-building tool in LMI communities. They 
involve individuals opening a savings account where money is deposited on a regular basis over 
a given amount of time. Once the individual reaches the match criteria, the account receives 
funds equal to the amount the individual has accrued over time. The match rates vary from 
program to program, but can be a 1:1 match or higher. 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a specific type of matched-savings account that is 
funded by the federal government and often supplemented by additional private funding. The 
savings must be used for one of the three purposes: housing, post-secondary education, or 
starting a new business. These accounts are most often used for housing with 28 percent of them 
used to purchase a home (Miller 2010).  
 
The use of IDAs as a tool for addressing home purchase barriers faced by LMI homebuyers has 
potential. Clearly participants are using this program to assist in saving for their home purchases 
in the future. This product also provides the most significant skin in the game of all the programs 
examined in this paper. Subsidy is provided through the match, but participants must 
successfully save their own portion to receive the additional funds. However, if IDA programs 
were expanded they would only shift demand over the long run given the amount of time it takes 
to save the matched amount (usually 1-2 years). This means IDAs would not help drive demand 
in the short run to stem the number of vacant properties on the market and help stabilize 
communities. These programs are not traditionally geographically based, so it does not lend itself 
to neighborhood targeting either. 
Homebuyer Tax Credits 
The United States enacted a series of legislation to create a first-time homebuyer tax credit for 
homes purchased between 2008 and 2010. The tax credits ranged from $6,500 to $8,000 or ten 
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percent of the purchase price. For home purchases in 2008, the credit must be repaid and acts as 
an interest-free loan. Later iterations of the tax credit acted as grants that did not need to be 
repaid if the homeowner uses the property as their primary residence for over three years (IRS 
2011). The tax credits also originally targeted first-time homebuyers, but the rules were 
expanded to include existing homeowners in later iterations. 
 
Homebuyer tax credits, which provide subsidies to individuals to purchase homes during certain 
time periods, were enacted to increase demand in the housing market given the housing crisis 
that began in 2007. This sort of direct subsidy makes sense as a demand driver. The fact that the 
program was expanded in 2009 and 2010 in order to broaden its impact shows that it was an 
attempt to stimulate demand. It was also a rapid response compared to actions where the federal 
government funds states and localities to develop down payment assistance programs such as 
NSP, which took much longer to implement. 
 
Despite the potential for tax credits to stimulate demand in the short-term, this strategy does not 
address distressed neighborhoods. These tax credits had no geographic component since any 
homebuyer that met the income limits and other criteria in the United States could access them. 
This type of broad strategy does not address the disproportionate effect of the foreclosure crisis 
on particular communities.  
 
The first-time homebuyer tax credit dealt with requiring skin in the game in varying ways as it 
evolved. In 2008, homebuyers that took the credit were required to pay the credit back. In effect, 
the credit acted as an interest free loan. This ten percent acted as skin in the game even if there 
was no initial down payment because the borrower would still be on the hook to pay back the 
credit. However, this policy changed for the later iterations of the tax credit in 2009 and 2010. 
The borrower was no longer required to pay back the tax credit if they staid in their home for at 
least three years. This means that there was very little skin in the game because they were able to 
recoup ten percent of their down payment at tax time. For borrowers taking out Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) loans at 3.5 percent down or less, this meant they were recouping more 
than their initial equity in their home. Although the tenure requirement could be considered skin 
in the game, it is significantly less time than other down payment assistance programs require 
(typically five to ten year). These factors make tax credits a feasible strategy for stimulating 
demand quickly, but they require minimal skin in the game and do not address larger place-based 
issues. 
Private Forms of Down Payment Assistance 
Seller-funded down payment assistance is a gift provided by non-profit organizations that are 
solely funded by private developers, real estate agents, and other stakeholders. The Internal 
Revenue Service ruled that these organizations were no longer tax-exempt in 2006 (IRS 2006). 
Often these entities were set up under the guise of being a charity when they actually acted as 
self-serving, circular-financing arrangements that avoided tax liability on real estate transactions. 
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These types of seller-funded arrangements are not an optimal strategy given the outlined policy 
goals. They may drive some demand by allowing less qualified buyers to purchase homes, but 
most of these transactions happen between associated parties conducting mortgage fraud. There 
is no neighborhood-specific component to the programs, but the schemes are sometimes tied to 
specific developments. Finally, there is no skin in the game from the borrower since the seller 
funds the full down payment requirement.  
 
Despite the prevalence of these private schemes in the past and their dubious intentions, there 
may be the potential for down payment assistance solutions offered by lenders in the form of 
altered loan terms. One approach may be for lenders to waive or lessen down payment 
requirements by requiring a higher interest rate over the course of the loan. Another approach 
could involve the lender increasing the loan principal to include the down payment and closing 
costs. These scenarios will be explored further in the financial analysis sections as a way to test 
potential private market solutions and their impact on borrowers. 
Soft Second/Forgivable Loans 
Soft second mortgages are secondary mortgages often used to provide down payment assistance 
in the form of a forgivable loan, a grant, or a traditional second loan. These are loans that cover 
the amount of the purchase price not traditionally covered by a primary mortgage. They also 
generally forgive, defer, or subsidize the loan in order to assist LMI borrowers. Local 
governments as well as non-profit community organizations provide soft seconds. The 
requirements for these programs vary greatly, but generally involve income and home value 
caps, using a conventional or FHA/VA loan from an approved lender, and tenure in the home for 
a certain number of years. 
 
The federal government provided direct funding for these types of down payment assistance 
programs from 2003 to 2008 through the American Dream Downpayment Initiative. This 
initiative provided direct funding to states and localities based on formulas developed by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. After 2008, funds distributed through the 
HOME program could be used for down payment assistance programs. NSP funds were also 
used to fund down payment assistance, as well as a variety of activities to encourage 
homeownership in LMI communities. States have the freedom to design their own programs 
which could include down payment assistance or not, depending on how the state chooses to use 
the funding (HUD 2011). 
 
Soft second down payment assistance programs have the potential to address all three goals 
outlined in this paper. Although the programs vary greatly, many of the programs stimulate local 
housing demand, target marginalized neighborhoods, and require skin in the game. 
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Soft second mortgage programs have the ability to stimulate local demand by incentivizing first-
time homebuyers to purchase in the current market and help them overcome barriers related to 
down payment requirements. These programs also have the flexibility to customize their 
programs to local conditions and market nuances. This helps to avoid the dangers of one-size-
fits-all policies such as tax credits. There is also the ability to drive demand in the short-term 
compared to matched savings programs, which take much more time for participants to save. 
 
Many soft second programs also address neighborhood specific issues. There is an opportunity to 
target communities disproportionately affected by the foreclosure crisis. Cities and counties can 
focus their down payment resources to complement other redevelopment efforts that are taking 
place in their jurisdictions. Often these programs have diverse funding sources, which can help 
make the program sustainable and their flexibility allows them to combine federal funds, 
community development finance tools, municipal bonds, and philanthropic support. These 
combined activities have the potential to create larger impact, rather than an isolated program 
with minimal community effects. 
 
Finally, these programs often require skin in the game while still increasing access for LMI 
borrowers. Many programs provide the full down payment for the purchase, but require the 
borrower to pay for closing costs up to $1,000 to $2,000. There are also usually strong tenure 
requirements where the loan is only forgiven if the borrower stays in their home and current on 
their primary mortgage for at least 10 years. Overall, these programs attempt to balance the 
tension between requiring buy-in from the borrower and increasing access. 
Loan Guarantees 
Loan guarantees have the potential to assist borrowers in securing a lower down payment 
requirement without the additional burden of having to also pay for private mortgage insurance. 
The concept is that the administrating entity could provide a guarantee of the primary mortgage 
as way to mitigate the lenders risk of allowing a lower down payment from the borrower. In the 
event that the borrower defaults, the administering entity is required to pay the lender any 
outstanding principal and interest owed by the borrower. 
 
Loan guarantees have the potential to address several of the policy goals outlined in this paper. 
This type of program has the ability to stimulate demand by mitigating the risk lenders have in 
accepting lower down payments. It also makes the loan less costly for borrowers because they 
would no longer need to purchase private mortgage insurance. Both of these factors would allow 
additional potential borrowers into the market where they would be excluded in the traditional 
private market. Loan guarantees require skin in the game by making the borrower pay the down 
payment and closing costs so that they build equity at closing. Loan guarantees do not typically 
deal with neighborhood specific housing markets. They tend to exist at the MSA level, if not the 
state or federal level, and would make it difficult to target subsidies to those communities hit 
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hardest by the housing crisis. This shortfall could be overcome by partnering with local 
communities to do specific outreach and marketing to those communities.  
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Financial Analysis 
In order to better understand the financial implications of specific down payment assistance 
program designs, five scenarios were defined based on the analysis above (see Figure 3). Three 
scenarios were developed to represent second loans provided by public and non-profit entities. 
These scenarios included a forgivable loan or soft second, a grant, and a traditional second loan. 
As outlined in the previous section, these types of down payment assistance fit closest with the 
policy goals outlined. A loan guarantee was also included to better understand the impact of 
covering losses on the primary as a way to lower down payment requirements. A private option 
was also included to determine the effectiveness of restructuring loan terms to provide 
significant down payment reductions and explore the potential for private market solutions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Down Payment Assistance Scenarios 
Scenario Definitions  
Forgivable Second 
Loan 
Assumes down payment equals 20% of the selling price. The forgivable loan 
has 0% interest and is only repaid at the point resell or default. 
Grant Assumes down payment equals 20% of the selling price. The grant is not paid back. 
Second Loan Assumes down payment equals 3.5% of the selling price. The loan must be repaid monthly over 10 years with annual interest rate of 2.5%. 
Loan Guarantee 
Assumes down payment equals 3.5% of the selling price and a loan guarantee 
of the primary mortgage at 100%. A reserve is held for 10% of the total fund 
based on predicted default rate. 
Increased Principal Assumes down payment and closing costs will be covered by an increased primary mortgage principal and an increased interest rate of 5.5%. 
 
 
The forgivable loan and grant scenarios were both created with the assumption that the borrower 
would qualify for down payment assistance equal to 20 percent of the selling price. The 
traditional second loan and loan guarantee assume that the borrower only qualifies for 3.5 
percent in order to limit their additional debt burden. The forgivable loan would act as a second-
lien loan to cover the gap in financing for clients that lack sufficient equity at the closing table. It 
would carry a 0 percent interest rate for the duration of the loan. The forgivable loan would 
become due in full if the borrower resold the property or defaulted on the primary mortgage. The 
grant would function similarly to the forgivable loan except that it would never need to be 
repaid; it would act as a one-time subsidy to the borrower. The second loan would act as a 
traditional second-lien loan that would have a below market monthly compounded interest rate 
(2.5 percent) and be amortized over 10 years with payments due monthly.  
 
The loan guarantee would cover the full amount of the primary mortgage in the event of default. 
By assuming a default rate of 10 percent (which is explained in further detail later), the down 
payment assistance provider is able to hold in reserve the full amount of down payment 
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assistance funding and make guarantees based on that reserve in a significantly higher volume. 
The private scenario adjusts the terms of the primary mortgage in order to lessen the burden of 
an upfront down payment requirement. It involves down payment assistance equal to 3.5 percent 
of the selling price. The provision of this assistance would result in a higher interest rate over the 
course of the primary loan (5.5 percent annually). The down payment and closing costs have 
been added to the principal of the primary mortgage.  
 
In the following financial analysis, these scenarios will be used to test the viability of different 
program designs for down payment assistance. The financial analysis was conducted on each 
scenario using market data from the Atlanta, Georgia MSA. The same financial analysis was also 
conducted for the Cleveland, Ohio and Phoenix, Arizona MSA’s. However, the results were 
similar in each case so only one set of data is presented here for the sake of simplicity.  
Assumptions 
Many assumptions were made in constructing the final financial model. Key inputs were defined 
using market data from secondary sources including funding allocations from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA), Federal Housing Administration (FHA) guidelines, and market analysis sites like 
Bankrate.com (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Input Assumptions for Financial Model 
 Variable Atlanta, GA  Definition 
Base Program Funding  $11,366,783  HUD funding allocation for the HOME program, 20114 
Number of Mortgages  4,272  Number of FHA/VA mortgages in LMI Tracts, 20105 
Avg Mortgage Amount  $261,393  Avg amount of FHA/VA mortgages in LMI Tracts, 20106 
Avg Selling Price  $270,874  Calculated assuming a 3.5% down payment 
Avg Closing Costs  $3,796  State average based on a $200,000 mortgage in 20117 
 
 
To find a baseline capitalization of each down payment scenario, 2011 geographic-specific 
funding allocations for HUD’s HOME program were used. The HOME program provides federal 
funds to states and localities to provide access to affordable housing. These flexible grants can be 
used in many ways, but often include down payment assistance programs. For this financial 
model, it is assumed that all of the 2011 funding will be used for down payment assistance. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Department of Housing and Urban Development (2011).  
5 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (2010).  
6 Ibid. 
7 Closing Costs by State (2011).	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Down payment assistance programs target low-and-moderate income households to increase 
access to homeownership in those communities. HMDA data was used to determine the number 
of mortgage originations in LMI census tracts (those with median income at 80 percent or below 
of area median income) and the average amount of those loans. FHA/VA loans were used 
because of the dominant role FHA is currently playing in the housing market, especially in LMI 
communities. The average selling price was determined by assuming a 3.5 percent down 
payment on the average mortgage amount. Finally, average closing costs for Georgia were 
included from Bankrate.com. 
Findings 
This section presents the findings of the financial model for Atlanta, Georgia once the down 
payment assistance scenarios were defined and market data was collected. These findings are 
presented thematically in the following sections and take into account the total cost to the 
borrower, amount of borrower equity, default rate, number of borrowers served, and the cost of 
the program.  
Cost to Borrower 
An important consideration of any down payment assistance program is the overall cost to the 
borrower. These programs, at least on the public side, have an explicit goal of increasing 
affordable and sustainable homeownership. By calculating the total cost of each lending scenario 
(full principal repayment plus interest, closing costs, and private mortgage insurance), it is clear 
that the forgivable loan and the grant provide the most favorable terms for the borrower (see 
Figure 5). These calculations assume full repayment and that the household does not resell the 
property. In these two scenarios the borrower will pay $354,103 dollars over the life of the 
primary loan. The main reason for the lower cost in these two scenarios is due to the upfront 
equity provided by the down payment assistance, which has lowered the initial principal of the 
primary mortgage.  
 
 
Figure 5. Total Cost of Mortgage to Borrower 
 
Forgivable 
Second Loan Grant Second Loan 
Loan 
Guarantee Private Loan 
Selling Price  $270,874   $270,874   $270,874   $270,874   $270,874  
Down Payment  $54,175   $54,175   $9,481   $9,481   $0  
Mortgage Principal  $216,699   $216,699   $261,393   $261,393   $274,670  
Second Loan  $54,175   $---   $10,725   $---   $---  
Monthly Payment  $973   $973   $1,427   $1,174   $1,731  
Total Cost   $(354,103)  $(354,103)  $(444,921)*+  $(435,834)  $(569,676)+ 
*These loan costs include the total cost of the primary and secondary loans 
+These loan costs include private mortgage insurance 
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The final three scenarios are less advantageous to the borrower from a cost perspective. The use 
of a traditional second loan in the third scenario is significantly more expensive due to the 
repayment of both loans. Although the second loan offers favorable loan terms to cover a down 
payment of 3.5 percent for the primary loan, it is clearly more expensive than the first two 
options. Similarly, the loan guarantee solution where the primary loan is covered allowing the 
borrower to avoid costly private mortgage insurance are slightly less expensive than the 
traditional second loan. This is mainly due to the difference in amortization (10 years versus 30 
years) for those costs. These options cost between $435,000 and $444,000 dollars each over the 
course of the loans. By far, the priciest option would be to capture the down payment through an 
increased interest rate (2 additional percentage points) and increased principal, which adds nearly 
$200,000 additional dollars to the cost of the loan compared to the most favorable options. It is 
clear that forgivable loans and grants would be the least costly and most beneficial for borrowers 
Borrower Equity and Default Rates 
Borrower equity is an important consideration in any down payment assistance program. In the 
previous analysis of total cost above, it was clear that the more equity the borrower brings to the 
closing table, in this case through down payment assistance, that the total cost over the life of the 
loan goes down since the initial principal is reduced. In addition to the reductions in cost, there 
may be additional benefits to increased borrower equity. For example, the borrower is less likely 
to owe more on the mortgage than the property is worth due to fluctuations in market prices like 
those currently being experienced in the foreclosure crisis. The financial model shows that 
forgivable loans and grants provide the most equity for the borrower (over 5 times the amount 
for the second loan and loan guarantee). The private option offers the borrower no equity since 
all down payment and closing costs are shifted into the loan principal (see Figure 5). 
 
Borrower equity is also an important factor in predicting default rates for the primary mortgage. 
Based on a study of over 46,000 mortgages made to low-and-moderate income borrowers across 
the country, the Center for Community Capital has identified a default rate of approximately 10 
percent for this portfolio of loan with a median loan to value of 96-97 percent. This proxy was 
used to predict the default rate for the loan guarantee scenario given comparable loan to value 
ratios. An analysis by the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) on risk 
characteristics and loan performance, has found that loan-to-value ratios play a significant role in 
determining loan delinquency. The higher the loan as a percentage of the selling price (or value), 
the higher chance that those loans will be 90 days delinquent. Using the assumed mortgage 
principal and down payment assistance divided by the calculated selling price, the financial 
model indicates combined loan-to-value ratios for each scenario (see Figure 6). Based on these 
combined loan-to-value ratios, predicated default rates are determined for the other scenarios 
using the loan guarantee as a baseline with a 10 percent default rate. This default rate was halved 
to 5 percent for the grant amount since it has a significantly lower loan to value at 80 percent. 
For the three scenarios with higher loan to values than the loan guarantee, associated default 
rates were adjusted slightly higher to 12-13 percent. Given these assumptions, it is clear that 
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grants and loan guarantees are the least riskiest down payment assistance products given their 
loan-to-value ratios. 
 
 
Figure 6. Default Rates based on Loan-to-Value Ratios 
 
Forgivable 
Second Loan Grant Second Loan 
Loan 
Guarantee 
Private 
Loan 
Selling Price  $270,874   $270,874   $270,874   $270,874   $270,874  
Combined Loans  $270,874   $216,699   $270,874   $261,393   $274,670  
Combined  
Loan-to-Value 100% 80% 100% 97% 101% 
Default Rate 12% 5% 12% 10% 13% 
 
Number Served and Cost to Public Provider 
Further analysis of the financial implications for the public scenarios uses the 2011 HOME 
program allocation to the Atlanta MSA as a basis for capitalizing each down payment assistance 
program. This base amount was divided by the calculated down payment amount or borrower 
equity to determine an estimated number of homebuyers that would be served by each program 
(see Figure 7). The traditional second loan serves significantly more homebuyers than either the 
forgivable loan or grant, with 28 percent of potentially eligible borrowers covered compared to 5 
percent. This results from the lower down payment assistance amount. Similarly, the loan 
guarantee also covers more borrowers than the forgivable second loan or grant because it is only 
paying out when a loan defaults. As has been mentioned, the traditional second loan and loan 
guarantee will result in higher costs to the borrower. They both also have higher default rates 
than the grant option. These factors can be viewed as a tradeoff with the ability to serve a much 
greater number of borrowers. 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of Homebuyers Served 
 
Forgivable 
Second Loan Grant Second Loan Loan Guarantee 
DPA Funding $11,366,783  $11,366,783  $11,366,783   $113,667,830  
Down Payment $54,175  $54,175  $9,481  $9,481  
Loan Volume 4272 4272 4272 4272 
# DPA Recipients 210 210 1199 725 
% DPA Coverage 5% 5% 28% 17% 
 
 
The differences between the three public scenarios are even more divergent when assessing the 
potential costs for the entity administrating each program. Cost and efficiency are important 
considerations given the volatility of federal funding and the emphasis on creating sustainable 
programs that will be in operation for years to come. Using the eight-year default rates based on 
loan-to-value ratios established earlier, the financial model estimates the cost to the 
administrating agency for each scenario (see Figure 8). For forgivable loans and grants, it was 
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assumed that all down payment assistance funds would be deployed as loans or grants. This 
means that all of the funds would be exhausted with no assumption of recouping any of them. 
The forgivable loan is structured this way because it is assumed that very little principal would 
be recouped in the event of default due to the borrower’s inability to pay and the second-lien 
position. There is no interest earned on these outstanding amounts due to the assumed terms of 
the loan. The grant does not collect any proceeds given its terms. The traditional second loan 
fares best when considering sustainability because it recoups the largest share of its down 
payment assistance funding. Its losses are related to its small down payment assistance amount 
and the assumption that it will collect principal plus interest on the second loan for 75 percent of 
those loans that do not default. The loan guarantee is slightly less expensive than the forgivable 
loan or grant due to the fact that it has a lower default rate and that it is assumed that it will only 
have to pay out 50 percent of the total defaulted mortgages. 
 
 
Figure 8. Funding Costs by Scenario 
 
Forgivable Second 
Loan Grant Second Loan Loan Guarantee 
# of DPA  
Recipients 210 210 1199 725 
8 year survival 88% 95% 88% 90% 
Actual Survived 185 199 1055 652 
Actual Defaulted 25 10 144 72 
Cost to Provider  $(11,366,783) $(11,366,783)  $(4,192,894)  $(9,472,319) 
 
 
It is clear that the four public scenarios have very different impacts for the borrowers that utilize 
them and the agencies that administer them. Forgivable loans and grants are relatively the same 
except for the lower default rate assumed for grants given its lower loan to value ratio. The 
traditional second loan has the potential to serve many more borrowers and recoup funds at a 
much higher rate allowing for additional lending and coverage of administrative costs, but offers 
much less in assistance and is significantly more costly to the borrower. The loan guarantee 
offers some promise since it allows for a slightly lower loan to value and default rate than all of 
the options except for the grant. The loan guarantee also serves a significant number of 
borrowers compared to the forgivable loan and grant (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Summary of Key Program Indicators 
 
Forgivable 
Second Loan Grant Second Loan Loan Guarantee 
Cost to Borrower  $(354,103)  $(354,103)  $(444,921)  $(435,834) 
Borrower Equity  $54,175   $54,175   $9,481   $9,481  
Default Rates 12% 5% 12% 10% 
DPA Recipients 210 210 1199 725 
Cost to Provider  $(11,366,783)  $(11,366,783) $(4,192,894)  $(9,472,319) 
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This financial analysis clearly shows varying impacts of down payment assistance scenarios on 
the borrower and the administering agency. Each program design has their tradeoffs. Private 
options seem to be the least feasible option given their costliness to the borrower and higher 
default rates. For the public options, traditional second loans are concerning given their higher 
default rates and cost to the borrower, however they are the least costly to the administering 
agency (without considering overhead). This would be even more of a problem if the down 
payment amount were raised to a similar level as the forgivable loan and grant. Grants seem to 
be preferable to forgivable loans given their lower loan to value and default rates.  
 
The loan guarantee seems to be the most effective program design given the assumptions made 
in this model. By using the down payment assistance funding to capitalize a significantly larger 
pool of guarantee funds, the program would serve a significant share of the loan volume. The 
default rate is the lowest when the grant is taken out of consideration. The cost to the borrower is 
significant, but less than a traditional second loan. It is also less costly to the administrating 
agency than the grant or forgivable second loan. This is without considering the lower overhead 
that loan guarantee programs typically require compared to managing a traditional second loan 
program. 
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Lessons Learned 
This project has described how down payment requirements act as a barrier for LMI borrowers 
in obtaining a mortgage and purchasing a home. Down payment assistance is a way to bridge this 
gap and increase homeownership. Down payment assistance can take many forms. Matched 
savings accounts, tax credits, private market, loan guarantees, and soft second programs have 
been explored as possible policy responses to this problem. Given the policy goals outlined 
earlier in this paper, loan guarantees and grants were found to perform best in the financial 
modeling conducted. In this section, specific recommendations are outlined for effective down 
payment assistance programs based on each policy goal. 
 
Stimulate Demand 
To stimulate demand in local housing markets that are still lagging from the foreclosure crisis, it 
is recommended that the Federal Government make substantial investments in down payment 
assistance. This should include recreating the American Dream Downpayment Initiative or 
another federal initiative that would give direct federal funding to states and localities to support 
their down payment assistance work. Funding should also be expanded in order to have a large 
impact and stimulate the housing market in the short-term. For the long run, these federal 
allocations should be dependable to allow local programs to plan for sustainability. It is also 
important to preserve the flexibility on the ground to address local market nuances and customize 
program design as long as key requirements are fulfilled. 
 
Skin in the Game 
Research suggests that requiring skin in the game lowers the likelihood of default. For down 
payment assistance programs that are focused on increasing access to homeownership for LMI 
borrowers, this should mean continuing to provide substantial assistance while also creating 
requirements that insure investment and buy-in from the borrower. Strategies for requiring skin 
in the game could take many forms.  
• Require participants to pay a certain percentage of the down payment or closing costs. 
Some programs require at least $1,500 of participant investment in the process. 
• Include “sweat equity” options similar to Habitat for Humanity where participants can 
build equity through rehabilitation work in order to show investment.  
• Make soft second loans forgivable after set tenure periods based on the amount of 
assistance invested. Loans balances could be pro-rated each year to reflect a change in 
equity. Typically, loans are forgiven after three, five, or ten years.  
• Finally, require fully documented underwriting and screen primary mortgage lenders that 
can participate. This will help address other factors that have led to loan default in LMI 
communities. 
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Incentivize Homeownership in Marginalized Communities 
Down payment assistance models have the potential to address homeownership in communities 
hard hit by the foreclosure crisis. It is recommended that states and municipalities target their 
limited down payment assistance resources in communities where other redevelopment activities 
are occurring. This targeting should include the following. 
 
First, combine people and place-based strategies in order to maximize the benefit in marginalized 
communities. Continue to offer baseline down payment assistance programs based on income 
and housing price requirements. Then layer additional neighborhood-specific down payment 
assistance to incentivize homeownership in hard hit neighborhoods. This combination of 
incentives allows choice but ensures additional resources for communities most in need. 
 
Second, states and municipalities should couple targeted down payment assistance programs 
with other redevelopment efforts and neighborhood stabilization resources. These efforts include 
requirements that borrowers participate in housing counseling and homebuyer education 
programs, additional affordable housing development, property rehabilitation efforts, and lease 
to purchase programs. 
 
Additional Ideas for Further Research  
In addition to the policy goals outlined above, more in-depth research should be conducted to 
further understand the implications and best practices related to down payment assistance 
program design. Although the private scenario in the financial model was shown to be less 
attractive, the potential for private solutions should not be ignored. There is potential to work 
with the mortgage lending industry and government regulators to explore connections between 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and down payment assistance products provided by 
lenders. There is also the potential to consider home improvement loans as a form of down 
payment assistance or second loan to assist mortgage ready borrowers to purchase foreclosed 
homes in the current environment.  
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Conclusion 
Down payment assistance remains a key tool in driving first-time home purchases in the local 
housing markets. LMI borrowers face particular hurdles in accumulating the cash to meet down 
payment requirements, particularly in times of tightened lending criteria in the wake of the 
foreclosure crisis. Down payment assistance programs take many forms and involve varying 
program designs. This paper has attempted to provide the context and describe the need for down 
payment assistance programs in communities that have been disproportionately affected by the 
foreclosure crisis. Using a variety of methods including a national survey and local stakeholder 
interviews, policy critiques, and financial analysis, this paper has described the potential impacts 
varying program designs may have on both the borrower and the administrating authority. In the 
end, loan guarantees seem to hold the most benefit for the parties involved. They have the 
potential to stimulate local housing demand, provide skin in the game, and incentivize 
homeownership in marginalized communities. 
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Appendix I: Survey Questions 
 
Survey Questions 
 
1. Please indicate how often each condition has been a factor over the past 12 months that 
may have prevented reasonably qualified applicants from obtaining a mortgage today.  
a. Down Payment Requirement Too High  
• Most often 
• Sometimes a barrier 
• Rarely or Never 
• I don’t know 
 
b. Down Payment Sources Not Available  
• Most often 
• Sometimes a barrier 
• Rarely or Never 
• I don’t know 
 
2. Considering the past 12 months, please indicate which of these types of loans, if any, 
were most regularly used (at least 20% of the time). Please select all that apply. 
• Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
• Purchase/Rehab Loan 
• Soft Second Mortgage or Down Payment Assistance 
• Some Other Government Assistance Program 
• 80/10/10 or 80/20’s – With a Lender Providing the Second Lien Financing to 
Purchase 
• Seller Contributions (Including Seller Financing or Seller Assistance with 
Closing Costs/Down Payment) 
• None 
• I don’t know 
 
3. How do you expect the availability of Down Payment Assistance (DPA) programs to 
meet the needs of your clients in 2011?  
• There is more than enough supply of DPA 
• Supply and demand for DPA are about in balance 
• There will be a modest shortfall of DPA funds available 
• There will be a severe shortage of DPA available 
• I don’t know 
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4. Currently, are your clients being required to put down higher down payments than in the 
past? (CHECK BOXES) 
• Yes 
• No 
• I don’t know 
 
5. If your clients are being required to put down higher down payments, what are the 
LOWEST down payment options generally available today?  
• I don’t know/Decline to answer (CHECK BOX) 
• (Fill-in Box, whole number) ____% 
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Appendix II: Down Payment Assistance Scenarios 
 
Forgivable Second Loan 
 Value Definition 
Base Program Funding  $11,366,783  Based on 2010 HOME Funds for Atlanta, GA  
Mortgage Principle  $216,699  
Based on the average mortgage amount for FHA 
loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA in 2010 
from HMDA. Calculated by subtracting 20% down 
payment from selling price. 
Interest Rate 3.5% Based on FHA base interest rate 
Monthly Payment $973  Calculated based on 30 year fixed rate mortgage  
Down Payment 20.0% Assumed 20% down payment 
Buyer Equity $54,175  Selling price multiplied by 20% down payment 
Mortgage Insurance  $0  Private mortgage insurance not needed  
DPA Interest 0.0% Assumed 0% interest for forgivable loan 
Closing Costs  $3,796  Based on Georgia average, Bankrate.com  
Combined LTV 100% 80% primary mortgage, 20% forgivable loan 
Loan Volume 4272 Based on the number of FHA loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA MSA in 2010 from HMDA 
DPA Recipients  210  Calculated by dividing DPA Funding by Borrower Equity  
Coverage Rate 5% Calculated by dividing DPA Recipients by Loan Volume  
Default Rate 12% Calculated by multiplying 10% default rate by 1.2 
8 year survival 88% Calculated 100% minus 12% default rate 
Actual Survived 185 Calculated by multiplying survival rate by DPA Recipients 
Actual Foreclosed  25  Calculated DPA recipients minus Survived 
Cost to Lender  $(11,366,783) Assumes full DPA funding amount spent 
Total Cost to Borrower  $(354,103.08) Calculated by summing primary loan (principal and interest) and closing costs 
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Grant 
 Value Definition 
Base Program Funding  $11,366,783  Based on 2010 HOME Funds for Atlanta, GA 
Mortgage Principle  $216,699  
Based on the average mortgage amount for FHA 
loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA in 2010 from 
HMDA. Calculated by subtracting 20% down 
payment from selling price. 
Interest Rate 3.5% Based on FHA base interest rate 
Monthly Payment $973  Calculated based on 30 year fixed rate mortgage 
Down Payment 20.0% Assumed 20% down payment 
Buyer Equity $54,175  Selling price multiplied by 20% down payment 
Mortgage Insurance  $0 Private mortgage insurance not needed.  
DPA Interest 0.0% No interest for grant. 
Closing Costs  $3,796  Based on Georgia average, Bankrate.com 
Combined LTV 80% 80% primary mortgage, 20% equity 
Loan Volume 4272 Based on the number of FHA loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA MSA in 2010 from HMDA 
DPA Recipients  210  Calculated by dividing DPA Funding by Borrower Equity 
Coverage Rate 5% Calculated by dividing DPA Recipients by Loan Volume 
Default Rate 5% Calculated by multiplying 10% default rate by .5 
8 year survival 95% Calculated 100% minus 5% default rate 
Actual Survived 199 Calculated by multiplying survival rate by DPA Recipients 
Actual Foreclosed  10  Calculated DPA recipients minus Survived 
Cost to Lender  $(11,366,783) Assumes full DPA funding amount spent 
Total Cost to Borrower  $(354,103.08) Calculated by summing primary loan (principal and interest) and closing costs 
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Traditional Second Loan 
 Value Definition 
Base Program Funding  $11,366,783  Based on 2010 HOME Funds for Atlanta, GA 
Mortgage Principle  $261,393  
Based on the average mortgage amount for FHA loans 
made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA in 2010 from 
HMDA. Calculated by subtracting 3.5% down 
payment from selling price. 
Interest Rate 3.5% Based on FHA base interest rate 
Monthly Payment $1,174  Calculated based on 30 year fixed rate mortgage 
Down Payment 3.5% Assumed 3.5% down payment 
Buyer Equity $9,481  Selling price multiplied by 3.5% down payment 
Monthly PMI $163  Selling price multiplied by 1.25% divided by 20 periods 
Upfront PMI $4,574  Mortgage principal multiplied by 1.75% 
PMI  $7,841.79  Total private mortgage insurance calculated by adding monthly (1.25%) and upfront (1.75%) costs 
DPA Interest 2.5% Assumed 2.5% interest rate for second loan 
Second Loan Amount $10,725  Calculated using 2.5% fixed-rate with a 10-year amortization. 
Second Loan Monthly 
Payment $89  
Calculated using 2.5% fixed-rate with a 10-year 
amortization. 
Closing Costs  $3,796  Based on Georgia average, Bankrate.com 
Combined LTV 100% 96.5% primary mortgage, 3.5% second loan 
Loan Volume 4272 Based on the number of FHA loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA MSA in 2010 from HMDA 
DPA  
Recipients  1,199  
Calculated by dividing DPA Funding by Borrower 
Equity 
% Coverage 28% Calculated by dividing DPA Recipients by Loan Volume 
Default Rate 12% Calculated by multiplying 10% default rate by 1.2 
8 year survival 88% Calculated 100% minus 12% default rate 
Actual Survived 1055 Calculated by multiplying survival rate by DPA Recipients 
Actual Foreclosed  144  Calculated DPA recipients minus Survived 
Cost to Lender $(4,192,894) 
Multiplied Buyer Equity times Actual Foreclosed 
minus the survived loan amount times a 75% 
collection rate. 
Total Cost to Borrower  $(444,921) 
Calculated by summing primary loan (principal and 
interest), second loan (principal and interest), closing 
costs, and PMI 
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Loan Guarantee 
 Value Definition 
Base Program Funding  $113,667,830  Based on 2010 HOME Funds for Atlanta, GA as a 10% capitalization for a guarantee fund. 
Mortgage Principle  $261,393  
Based on the average mortgage amount for FHA loans 
made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA in 2010 from 
HMDA. Calculated by subtracting 3.5% down 
payment from selling price. 
Interest Rate 3.5% Based on FHA base interest rate. 
Monthly Payment $1,174  Calculated based on 30 year fixed rate mortgage. 
Down Payment 3.5% Assumed 3.5% down payment 
Buyer Equity $9,481  Selling price multiplied by 3.5% down payment 
PMI  $0  Private mortgage insurance not needed.  
DPA Interest 0.0% No interest included. 
Closing Costs  $3,796  Based on Georgia average, Bankrate.com 
Combined LTV 97% 96.5% primary mortgage, 3.5% equity 
Loan Volume 4272 Based on the number of FHA loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA MSA in 2010 from HMDA 
# of DPA  
Recipients  725  
Calculated by dividing DPA Funding by Borrower 
Equity 
% Coverage 17% Calculated by dividing DPA Recipients by Loan Volume 
Default Rate 10% Assumed rate based on UNC Center for Community Capital research 
8 year survival 90% Calculated 100% minus 12% default rate 
Actual Survived 652 Calculated by multiplying survival rate by DPA Recipients 
Actual Foreclosed  72  Calculated DPA recipients minus Survived 
Cost to Lender  $(9,472,319) 
Calculated Mortgage Principal times Actual 
Foreclosures times 50% discount for principal already 
paid. 
Total Cost to Borrower  $(435,834) Total cost of primary loan (principal and interest) plus down payment and closing costs. 
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Private Loan 
 Value Definition 
Base Program Funding  n/a  n/a 
Mortgage Principle  $274,670  
Based on the average mortgage amount for FHA loans 
made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA in 2010 from 
HMDA. Includes 100% LTV plus closing costs plus 
PMI 
Interest Rate 5.5% Based on FHA base interest rate 
Monthly Payment $1,560  Calculated based on 30 year fixed rate mortgage 
Down Payment 0.0% Assumes 0% down payment 
Buyer Equity $0  Selling price multiplied by 0% down payment 
Monthly PMI $172  Selling price multiplied by 1.25% divided by 20 periods 
Upfront PMI $4,807  Mortgage principal multiplied by 1.75% 
PMI  $8,240.09  Total private mortgage insurance calculated by adding monthly (1.25%) and upfront (1.75%) costs 
DPA Interest 0.0% Included in primary loan. 
Closing Costs  $3,796  Based on Georgia average, Bankrate.com 
Combined LTV 101% Loan is 101% of selling price, includes closing costs 
Loan Volume 4272 Based on the number of FHA loans made in LMI tracts in Atlanta, GA MSA in 2010 from HMDA 
# of DPA  
Recipients  n/a  n/a 
% Coverage n/a n/a 
Default Rate 13% Calculated by multiplying 10% default rate by 1.3 
8 year survival 88% Calculated 100% minus 12% default rate 
Actual Survived n/a n/a 
Actual Foreclosed n/a  n/a 
Cost to Lender n/a n/a 
Remaining DPA Funds n/a  n/a 
Total Cost to Borrower  $(569,676)  Calculated by adding cost of primary loan (principal and interest) and PMI 
 
